Patrick Murtagh
LINCHPIN

On December 6, 2008 it was not a dark and stormy night when the shot rang out, but it soon became so as a police bullet killed 15 year old Alexis Grigoropoulos. Not that such incidents are unusual. According to a spokesman for the anarchosyndicalist Greek ESE “dozens of Greeks have been killed by the police” since the end of the military dictatorship in 1973.

What was unique was the response, perhaps indicative of the harder times that we have entered. Within minutes the news spread across the country via cell phone, and informal groups of friends had gathered to protest the murder.

Protest turned to riot, and for some weeks the conservative government of Greece teetered on the brink of defeat. Dozens of universities and high schools were occupied. Working class demonstrations and a one day general strike coincided with the student revolt. The government was saved, not by its own efforts but rather by a loss of nerve on the part of the socialist PASOK and the communist KKE who ended up criticising the insurgent students and the left-socialist Syriza more than they did the government.

The events didn’t occur in a vacuum. Decades of student militancy have garnered widespread public sympathy since 1973. Tactics such as university occupations are almost routine. Then there is the general state of the Greek economy and society. Youth unemployment and underemployment are endemic and growing. The government has come to be widely seen as both corrupt and incompetent. While recklessly accumulating public debt (foreign debt was estimated to total 93.9% of GDP in 2008) the state has been demonstrably generous to its corporate friends. In various social conflicts over the past decade the state has sometimes emerged victorious, but often has been forced to back down in the face of popular movements.

Few of the factors that underlay the revolt in Greece are unique to that country, aside from the existence of a relatively large and militant anarchist movement. It is no wonder that European governments openly worried about the spread of such revolts to other countries. The Greek insurgents attempted to spread the insurrection internationally, using media events and the same cell phone tactics that had proven successful locally. The response was widespread – perhaps hundreds of sympathy actions worldwide – but distinctly poorly attended.

Then, incredibly anticlimactically, the Revolution was called off for Christmas. When the New Year arrived the usual militant Greek demonstrations resumed, but without the mass participation and occupations of December. An opportunity had been lost.

What happened shows that mass rebellion is possible in a modern state and, given economic conditions, it is almost inevitable. It also showed that modern technology can amplify small scale initiatives into mass movements. It also showed that such movements can be, at best, inspired, never directed. The Leninist dream is over.
It was also demonstrated that such rebellions have to go beyond mere street fighting if they are to lead to anything permanent. The Greeks began this process with their occupations of educational institutions and brief takeovers of media outlets. They were unable to go further, however, because of a lack of response from Greek workers who generally remained passive outside of young workers in the streets. Without such participation, “revolts” will remain limited and inevitably fizzle out with little gained.

Finally, while rebellions are inevitably spontaneous, in the absence of organization and vision they cannot go further to actually change society. This may have been the main reason for the passivity of the Greek working class. Without such a vision and clear ideas on how to achieve it, one cannot depend on any vanguard, whether it is a party or whether it is those most willing to fight in the streets.

Patrick edits Molly’s Blog:
http://mollymew.blogspot.com

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